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1
Introduction
Since 1980 the volume of world merchandise trade tion and Development (OECD) countries' growth
has grown only 3.6 percent a year, down from the of gross domestic product (GDP) will slow sig-
1960s and 1970s, when the annual growth aver- nificantly from the rates recorded before 1980.
aged 5.3 percent. The volume of developing coun- Thus, at a time when the openness of the interna-
try manufactured exports, however, has consis- tional trading system is increasingly threatened
tently expanded more rapidly than world trade by new trade barriers and domestic assistance to
- in the 1980s, as well as the 1960s and 1970s. In industry, it is particularly important to develop-
1985, developing countries supplied 12 percent ing countries that openness be maintained.
of the world's exports of manufactures, up from 7 In keeping with this concern, this paper exam-
percent a decade earlier. While 1980's 8 percent a ines two questions:
year growth of manufactured exports is below * What is the impact of industrial countries'
the 12 to 14 percent annual growth recorded over "industrial" policies on developing country trade
the previous 15 years, it has been one of the few in manufactures?2
buoyant factors in developing country exports.' * What policy changes to benefit developing
Many factors lie behind this impressive per- countries might be taken up at the ongoing Uru-
formance. Among the more important were the guay Round of multilateral trade negotiations?
efforts by the developing countries to expand This paper covers only some of the effects of
their resource bases and to use them more effec- the policy measures it examines, and these meas-
tively. The open international trading system ures are only one factor among many that influ-
governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs ence the growth of developing countries. The
and Trade (GATT) has also been important, as World Bank has long emphasized the importance
has the steady, significant income expansion since of a developing country's domestic policies. In
1950 in the industrial countries. This income recent World Development Reports, the Bank has
growth fueled demand for manufactured imports, drawn attention to the costs that trade restric-
and along with trade liberalization, encouraged tions impose on the country itself - and indus-
developing countries to enter the product cycle trial countries that attempt to protect themselves
as changes in comparative advantage occurred. with trade restrictions are no exception. This
Slower growth in the 1980s - of world trade as report examines a subject that previous World
well as of developing countries' trade - is due Bank reports have not thoroughly explored -
mostly to slower income growth, and prospects the cross-country effects of industrial countries'
are that the Organization for Economic Coopera- policies on developing country trade and output.
I
Industrial policies: what are they?
Industrial policies are government actions and other public services support productive activity
programs that support particular firms or indus- in general. They might affect the size or the
tries. These policies, which are conditioned by effectiveness of a country's resource base, but
different institutional and policy settings and their effect on the allocation of that resource base
aimed at different objectives, often reflect no to one activity or another is minimal. Macro-
overall economic strategy.3 While their advo- economic policies that influence overall efficiency,
cates often focus on the benefits of industrial expenditures or savings rates without influenc-
policies, it is often forgotten that there are many ing allocations to one sector or another would be
direct costs. Some programs or policies - de- considered general - not industrial - policies.4
signed to favor labor, regional development or Some policies support a domestic industry by
other industries - have clear and specific ad- restricting imports of competing goods. Tariffs
verse effects on industries, often to the detriment and import quotas are the traditional forms of
of the country's export potential. For the pur- import restriction, but governments have been
pose of this paper, however, we shall only exam- able to find many novel and complex ways to
ine those policies that are at least ostensibly de- restrict imports. Other policies, sometimes la-
signed to benefit industries. beled "Nonborder Measures," provide a more
While some policies or functions of govern- direct stipend or subsidy to domestic production
ment are designed to affect particular productive - for example, a direct cost subsidy, an advanta-
enterprises or sectors, the effects of other func- geous depreciation or investment allowance, an
tions and policies are available to all enterprises interest subsidy, tax relief, concessional financ-
and sectors. Enforcement of commercial law, ing from public funds, and many other instru-
provision of roads and highways, education and ments.S
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Domestic subsidies
The multiplicity of objectives and forms of indus- building and steel, and - to a lesser extent -
trial support tends to complicate analysis of such electronics, aircraft, and autos.
policies. Direct subsidies are readily quantifi- The balance of payments dimension of the oil
able, and a skilled analyst can estimate the "sub- shock created an interest in expanding exports,
sidy equivalent" of policies such as tax allow- and this interest led to a considerable increase in
ances or loans from public funds. On the other indirect export subsidies provided through gov-
end of the scale, it is quite difficult to quantify emient export credits, insurance, and guaran-
"administrative guidance," and perhaps even tees. The subsidy element in such programs
more difficult to calculate its subsidy equivalent.6 however, has been small relative to direct subsi-
Even where the accounts of subsidy-granting dies to domestic production.8
agencies are complete and comparable, the task The expansion has apparently stabilized since
of pulling together such information is long and the mid-1980s. "Almost all OECD member coun-
complex. A recent study of German support tries have begun to retreat on a number of inter-
programs reports, for example, that the relevant ventionist fronts, especially on subsidies support-
inventory included some 10,000 different items ing specific industries or enterprises."9 Part of
from the budgets of several hundred governmen- this stemmed from the contraction of the indus-
tal agencies.7 tries subsidized. Some contracted in work force
and capacity as planned, others in spite of plans.
Expansion of domestic subsidies For instance, until the mid-1970s Sweden's eco-
nomic and industrial development was supported
Subsidies to industry expanded widely after in the main by macroeconomic and tax policy.
the first oil shock and grew rapidly through the The government shifted in 1976-77 to a much
early 1980s. The expansion was particularly larger, more selective industrial program de-
marked in Western Europe. Even in countries in signed to support specific enterprises or indus-
which such aid is traditionally low, such as the tries, such as shipbuilding. From 1982-83 to 1985-
United States and Switzerland, there was a sub- 86, however, industrial aid fell substantially and
stantial rise. shifted significantly toward functional categories,
Much of the rise was assistance to help indus- such as aid to research and development, or to
try and transport adjust to increased petroleum regional development.
prices; financial or tax incentives to save energy A simnilar shift has been recorded in France.
or switch to fuels produced at home -electric- The French steel industry's labor force today is
ity, gas, and coal. That part of the increased only half as large as in the 1970s. Restructuring
assistance not aimned at energy tended to focus on has reduced aid to cover operating losses to less
a small number of sectors in difficulty: ship- than FF1 billion, well below the FF7 to FF10 bil-
3
Table 1 Distribution of fiscal assistance to support a sector that provides from 2 to 5
across sectors percent of GNP.
Lack of information on fiscal support to indus-
Federal Republic try makes it not only difficult to compare its
of Gennany, 1984 France, 1982 magnitude with that of trade restrictions, it makes
Percentage of Percentage of it almost impossible to estimate its impact on
Sector total assistance Sector total assistance specific trading partners. Nevertheless, several
Agriculture and Agriculture and generalizations seem defensible:
food processing 17 food processing 27 * Fiscal assistance focuses on agriculture, coal
production, and services, particularly transpor-
Industry and Industry 25 tation services, rather than on manufacturing.
mining 17 * Within the manufacturing sector, support is
Transportation Energy 7 moving toward high technology and defense-
and utilities 31 related industries. These tend to be industries in
which most competition is among industrial coun-
Housing and Construction and tries.
human services 35 housing 9 * In the manufacturing sector, fiscal support
Transport 17 appears to be small relative to assistance through
import restrictions.
Commerce and
other services 15 Sectoral incidence
Total 100 Total 100 Limited information is available on the distri-
Source: France: Dutailly (1984, p. 7). Federal Republic of bution of fiscal assistance across sectors. Table 1
Germany: Juttemeier (1987, p. 26). provides data on the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and France showing the concentration of
assistance on agriculture and services. In 1985,
lion spent earlier in the decade. Similarly, the industry provided 34 percent of France's GDP, 40
state Renault automobile group, which cut its percent of Germany's; its share of nonborder as-
work force by a fourth is now operating profita- sistance was considerably lower in each country.
bly. Part of the explanation is continued border Agriculture, on the other hand, contributed only
protection. As in Sweden, there has been a sig- 2 percent of Germany's GDP and 4 percent of
nificant shift in the state aid that remains toward France's, yet received 17 percent and 27 percent,
support of research and development. respectively, of governmental nonborder assis-
The United States, with the election of a conser- tance.
vative administration in 1980, moved away from Though manufacturing generally receives rela-
an active industrial policy, although individual tively low levels of nonborder support, some
states continue to compete actively in offering manufacturing industries have been heavily sup-
subsidies for plant locations. Cutbacks in indus- ported. As noted above, the iron and steel sector
trial subsidies in many countries were obviously in Western Europe has been heavily subsidized.
related to fiscal problems. At the same time there But reductions in subsidy payments have been
has been an upsurge of interest in deregulation more or less simultaneous with output contrac-
and privatization in many industrial countries. tions, so the lower subsidies still represent a sig-
While there has been some leveling off in do- nificant percentage of the value of output. Ship-
mestic assistance to industry, the same does not building and aircraft are other manufacturing
seem to be true for agriculture.'0 As the 1986 sectors for which the ratio of assistance to value-
World Development Report documents, one result added exceeds the economy-wide average.
of industrial countries' support for agriculture Other activities, although they have received
has been that production outpaced domestic some assistance, would be net "payers" rather
demand, and the resulting surpluses disrupted than receivers of such assistance. Fiscal and bor-
international markets and displaced developing der interventions do not create resources. They
country exporters. According to the report subsi- move them from one use to another. While their
dies for agricultural exports entailed domestic proponents tend to stress the effects that will be
costs in the range of 0.6 to 1.0 percent of GNP - produced where the resources move to, equal
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attention should be paid to the effects where they barriers (NTBs), and relatively low subsidies, but
move from."' the figure is broadly indicative of the "mix" of
border versus nonborder protection for indus-
Comparison of subsidies and trade trial countries.'4
restrictions In sum, industrial countries' government sub-
sidies to industry tend to be small relative to
Except for agriculture, direct comparisons of bor- subsidies for agriculture and transportation -
der and nonborder assistance are rare. In the and relative to the assistance provided to indus-
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zeal- try by restricting imports. To the extent that
and - major net agricultural exporters - two subsidies are provided to the manufacturing sec-
thirds or more of the assistance to agriculture is tor, they primarily affect developing country
provided through government payments and exports in three industries: petroleum, (which
purchases, while in Japan and Western Europe substitutes for domestically produced coal), ship-
-net agricultural importers - two thirds of the building, and steel. Subsidies to shipbuilding
assistance is provided by consumers through high have declined in recent years, and developing
domestic prices.'2 countries now supply over a third of global ex-
For manufacturing, however, the only such ports of ships and boats - up from 7 percent in
comparison available applies to Australia. Data 1970. From 1970 to 1975 the developing country
prepared by the Australian Industries Assistance share of global steel exports increased from 7 to
Commission indicate that import restrictions 15 percent, and industrial country support for
provide more than 95 percent of governmental steel has shifted from subsidies to import restric-
assistance to the manufacturing sector.'3 Among tions. Increasingly, tariff and nontariff barriers
industrial countries Australia tends to have rela- are the industrial policies that most affect devel-
tively high tariffs, relatively extensive nontariff oping countries.
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Tariffs: patterns and effects
Following seven rounds of multilateral negotia- MFN rates
tions in the GATT since 1947, tariffs in the indus-
trial countries are on average quite low. In the MFN rates are the standard rates in industrial
Kennedy Round of the 1960s, tariffs on all but countries'tariff schedules. They are, on the whole,
key sensitive products, such as textiles and steel, bound under the GATT, that is, each country has
were reduced some 50 percent. In the 1970s To- promised to charge import duties (on goods from
kyo Round, the trade-weighted average most- any other GATT contracting party) no higher than
favored nation (MFN) rate on industrial prod- these posted rates. As table 2 shows, the MFN
ucts was estimated to h ave been reduced from rates on products that are important in develop-
7.0 percent to 4.7 percent for the industrial coun- ing country exports are generally higher. This
tries.'s The Generalized System of Preferences may reflect the low level of developing country
(GSP), introduced in the 1970s, has provided pref- participation in earlier trade negotiations. In any
erential access to imports from developing coun- case, these differences are part of the reason the
tries. rates actually applied to imports from develop-
Still, several characteristics of tariff schedules ing countries are higher than the rates on imports
still create significant market access problems for from other industrial countries. Another reason
developing countries. is that rates actually applied are discounted be-
* MFN rates are, on average, higher on goods low the EON rate more often on imports from
imported from developing countries. other industrial countries than on imports from
* Departures from MFN rates sometimes favor developing countries.
other industrial countries rather than developing
countries. Various preferential arrangements Departures from MFN rates
among industrial countries often outweigh the
impact of the GSP. The tariff rates that industrial countries actually
* Tariff peaks (that is, high tariffs) tend to be con- apply are often lower than the GATT's MFN rates.
centrated on products exported by developing This is well-known; preferences for all develop-
countries. ing countries (GSP), the least-developed coun-
* Tariff escalation (that is, higher tariff rates on tries (LLDCs), and even certain developing coun-
processed products than on the raw materials) tries (for instance, the Caribbean Basin Initiative
means that even relatively low tariff rates can and the Lome Convention) have reduced the ef-
generate relatively high effective rates of protec- fective tariffs faced by developing countries. What
tion and retard the movement of primary export- may not be so well known is that industrial coun-
ing countries into processing. tries offer substantial preferences to each other,
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induding those between the European Free Trade Table 2 Industrial countries' tariff averages
Association (EFTA) and the European Commu- on manufactures
nity (EC); between Australia and New Zealand; (import-weighted averages of post-Tokyo Round MFN
between the United States and Canada for auto- rates and applied rates as of 1983)
mobiles (40 to 50 percent of their trade in manu- Importing country MFN Applied
factures), and so on. The calculations in table 2 Origin of imports rate rate
compare MFN rates with the rates actually ap-
plied. Australia
The GSP and other tariff preferences for devel- Industrial countries 15.2 10.0
o countries are reflected in the differences Developing countries 18.4 9.8oping countrles are reIlectea m tne ulrrerenCeS Canada
between MFN and applied rates on imports from Industrial countries 7.7 4.6
developing countries. But reductions from MFN Developing countries 13.8 10.3
rates on imports from industrial countries are European Community
often even larger. Most EFTA countries have Industrial countries 5.6 3.3
applied rates three to four times higher on devel- Developing countries 6.0 4.5
applied ~~~~~~~~~~~~Finland
oping country goods, reflecting the duty-free Industrial countries 6.7 0.8
treatment of most manufactured goods traded Developing countries 11.1 6.7
between the European Economic Community Japan
(EEC) and EFTA. Industrial countries 4.2 3.9
Developing countries 5.2 2.9
New Zealand
Tariff peaks'6 Industrial countries 16.9 13.5
Developing countries 21.6 14.7
Despite generally low industrial country tariffs, Norway
20 percent of EC tariffs on manufactured imports Industrial countries 5.7 0.8
have MEN rates above 10 percent, as do 18 per- Developing countries 5.1 4.6
Sweden
cent of American and 13 percent of Japanese Industrial countries 5.0 0.8
manufactured tariff lines. Most of the higher Developing countries 7.2 5.7
rates protect textiles and clothing and miscella- Switzerland
neous manufactures; categories where develop- Industrial countries 2.7 0.2
Developing countries 2.8 2.6ing countries tend to have significant export po- United States
sitions. These high-rate sectors are also those Industrial countries 3.9 3.9
which have a higher incidence of nontariff barri- Developing countries 7.9 7.6
ers as well. As products in which developing
countries are strong exporters tend to be excluded Note: Applied rates are calculated from information on cus-
from tariff preference systems, developing coun- toms collections by tariff line, by country of origin.In the case of EC member states, trade-weighted rates against
try exports are usually subject to these high MFN industrial countries are based on imports from outside the
rates. Community, that is, intra-EC trade is exduded - not treated
as a departure from MFN rates. In computing applied rates
Tariff escalation account is taken of volume limitations on the application of
GSP rates.
Source: World Bank.Tariffs are a considerable barrier to processed
exports. For example, jute enters most industrial
countries duty free, but Austria's 3 percent duty oping country exports. The high rates on proc-
on jute fabrics provides 7 percent effective pro- essed goods shield domestic processors from
tection for Austrian processors of jute fabrics. import competition and encourage imports of
Similarly, Australia imports hides and skins duty raw materials. Table 4 (overleaf) shows the re-
free, but its 20 percent duty on leather manufac- sult: exports from developing countries are heav-
tures provides 36 percent effective protection for ily concentrated in products at lower stages of
those manufactures. Effective rates of protection production.
for oilseed processing exceed 50 percent in the This tariff escalation has negative effects on
EC and in Japan. primary production as well as on processing.
Table 3 (overleaf) shows the escalating tariff Tariffs on any stage raise the price of the final
and nontariff barriers faced by a variety of devel- good, and hence tend to reduce consumption.
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Table 3 Escalation of industrial country Table 4 Distribution of imports of selected
protection industrial countries by stage of processing
Processing drain Average NTB coverage Imports from
and stage tariff ratio' Distribution of developing countries
Meat imports as a percentage
Fresh and frozen 6.2 34.0 Level of from developing of imports from
Prepared 8.4 41.3 processing countries (percent) all countries
Fish
Fresh and frozen 4.3 56.9 Stage 1 72 41
Prepared 4.1 7.0
Vegetables Stage 2 25 30
Fresh 6.9 42.6
Preparations 13.2 16.4 Stage 3 2 29
Fruits
Fresh 7.4 24.0 Stage 4 1 11
Preparations 17.1 15.0
Tobacco All stages 100 36
Unmanufactured 12 12.0
Manufactures 18.1 25.0 Note: Indudes Australia, Austria, European Community
Sugar (10), Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Sugar and honey 1.0 51.0 Switzerland, and the United States. Product coverage is the
Preparations 20.0 19.0 same as table 3; stages, as listed there.
Cocoa Source: World Bank data.
Beans, powder, paste 1.0 0.0
Chocolate and products 3.0 1.0
Rubber
Crude 0.0 0.0
Manufactures 3.9 3.3
Leather Internal taxes have a similar effect. West Ger-
Hides and skins 0.1 0.0
Leather 2.9 1.7 many imposes a consumption tax of DM3.60 a
Manufactures 7.2 11.7 kilogram on unroasted coffee, DM4.30 a kilo-
Wood gram on roasted coffee, and DM9.35 a kilogram
Rough 0.0 0.0 on soluble coffee. Such internal taxes on tropical
Shaped 0.2 0.2 beverages are widespread in Western European
Manufactures 357 2.7 countries.'7 Without this tax and tariff burden,
Cotton consumption of final products - and therefore
Raw 0.0 0.0 demand for primary products - would be higher.
Yarn 3.0 2.2 Especially important for the poorer countries
Fabrics 5.8 62.1 are measures that would increase demand for
Ore 0.0 4.9 primary products and facilitate primary produc-
Pig iron 22 8.7 ing countries' advance to first-stage processing
Ingots and shapes 2.2 8.7 activities. Higher stage processing requires many
Bars and plates 3.4 18.7 of the same skills and factor inputs as manufac-
Other metaruc ores turing, and expansion of higher stage exports
Nonferrous ores g 0 4 9 tends to be dominated by industrial and advanced
Wrought and unwrought metals 2.4 1.0
Phosphates developing countries. There is, however, consid-
Natural 0.0 0.0 erable room for processing in lower-income coun-
Fertilizer 3.2 13.7 tries.
Vegetable oils Tariff escalation often protects very simple proc-
Oilseeds 4.4 15.8 esses. For example, the U.S. tariff on pineapples
Oils___________4____ 4________________ in bulk is 64 cents a kilogram. Based on 1984
a. The tariff rates are trade-weighted averages of rates actu- import-unit values, this comes to 8.4 percent ad
ally applied by Australia, Austria, the European Commu- valorem. On crated or packaged pineapples the
nity, Finland, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Swit- rate is 1.3 cents a kilogram. If packaging and
zerland, and the United States. crating increases the value of a shipment of pine-
b. Percentage of industrial countries' import value that is apples by 20 percent, then the effective rate of
subject to nontariff barriers.
Source: Yeats (1987, table 15.1). protection these nominal rates provide for pack-
8
aging and crating is 5.2 times higher than the rate additional charge on the sugar content. Again,
of protection provided to pineapple growers. The the effective protection provided the juicing proc-
EC duty is 9 percent ad valorem on pineapples; ess is proportionally higher. Imports of pine-
20 percent on unsugared pineapple juice. The EC apple juice from Lome Agreement countries en-
allows a GSP rate of 17 percent on unsugared ter duty free, but this source is not a serious
pineapple juice. On sugared juice, the rate is 19 threat to EC processors, accounting for less than
to 42 percent, depending on density, plus an 6 percent of EC consumption in 1983.
9
Nontariff barriers
While the momentum of past GATT negotiations Table 5 Indices of NTB coverage applied by
has continued to reduce industrial country tariffs selected industrial countries, 1981-1987
(the last tranche of cuts agreed at the Tokyo Round (1981 = 100)
went into effect January 1, 1987), the 1980s have
seen a slow but continuous increase in the use of 198 18 1
nontariff barriers, which now affect about one- All products except fuels
fifth of overall imports by industrial countries All NTBs 100 103 104 106 112 119 120
(see table 5). These restrictions take many differ- Hard-core NTBs 100 101 99 104 106 106 105
ent forms; the definition used here covers the
following categories of actions: On all products 100 101 99 103 104 104 104
Hard-core NTBs On manufactured
. Quantitative import restraints (including dis- products 100 99 11 101 112 111 109
cretionary import licensing)
* Voluntary export restraints (VERs) Note: The index is constructed as follows:
-Measures to enforce decreed prices Each imnporting country's "NTB schedule" for each year is
apphed to its import values as of 1984. (The intent is toOther NTBs isolate the expansion of NTBs, hence the changing schedule
* Tariff quotas of NTBs is applied to a given pattern of trade.)
* Antidumping and countervailing duties The proportion of total import value covered by each year's
* Price investigations and other price and vol- NTB schedule is converted to an index number, with 1981
ume monitoring measures Source UNCTAD (1986).
* Nondiscretionary or automatic import licens-
ing
Government procurement, health, sanitation, recorders, and other consumer electronic prod-
and technical regulations that might discriminate ucts imported by the EC from Japan and South
in favor of domestic suppliers are not covered for Korea;
lack of information. . Expansion of the product and country cover-
The expansion of hard-core NTBs reflects sev- age of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), and
eral widely reported actions: additional restraints on textile imports outside
* VERs on steel and steel products imported by the MFA.
the United States and the European Community Less often noted in the media but equally threat-
from all major suppliers; ening to an international trading system was the
* VERs on automobiles imported by Canada and simultaneous expansion of various kinds of im-
the United States; port surveillance and import price discipline
* VERs on television receivers, video cassette measures, particularly antidumping measures.
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From 1980 to 1986, there were 1,605 antidumping change was the elimination by the United States
or countervailing duty cases in the industrial of an automatic licensing requirement on imports
countries. Sixty percent (981) led to a formal of petroleum. But on the whole, approximately
import restriction; many others were part of a $4.00 of industrial countries' imports have come
process that led to VERs. under hard-core import controls for each $1.00
Analyses of antidumping cases in Australia, on which such controls have been removed. New
the United States and the EC - three of the most VERs fell relatively heavily on developing coun-
frequent users - have found that antidumping try exports. For example, of 124 such arrange-
enforcement is often protection for domestic in- ments listed by GATT, 77 were with a develop-
dustries. It imposes limits on foreign sellers that ing country exporter."9
antitrust regulations do not impose on domestic NTBs cover approximately the same percent-
firms. The Australian study recommended that age of industrial countries' total imports from
Australia "reduce the discrepancy between the developing as from industrial countries. (Annex
concept of 'unfair trading practices' as it is ap- table 1) But beneath this overall equality lie con-
plied within Australia and as it is applied by siderable sectoral differences. Since many tropi-
Australia to its imports."'8 Apart from formal cal products, fuels, and raw materials tend to be
import restrictions and VERs, the frequency with noncompetitive, they face fewer NTBs than more
which such cases are filed against successful ex- competitive food and raw materials imported
porters creates considerable uncertainty that their from industrial (often temperate-climate) coun-
performance can be maintained, given the do- tries. In manufactures, where they do compete
mestic politics of administered protection. This head-on, however, developing countries' exports
has a chilling effect on developing country efforts face 50 percent more NTBs than industrial coun-
to make the efficiency gains and investments tries. Nearly a third of industrial country im-
necessary for export-led growth. ports of manufactures from major developing
Some import barriers were removed in the country exporters are subject to NTBs - more
1980s, for instance, on American and Canadian than two-thirds of textiles and clothing imports,
imports of footwear. Among soft NTBs the major more than half of steel imports.
11
Evolving forms of protection
The forms of protection that have become popu- restrictions on imports from developing coun-
lar over the last decade are complex. A tariff tries.
reduces export volume and at the same time From different perspectives the MFA appears
pushes down the price the exporter will receive. to be different things. To governments of devel-
A VER reduces import volume but at the same oping countries that are major suppliers or have
time allows the exporter to collect a higher price the potential to be major suppliers, the MFA re-
and thereby gain greater profits on a smaller vol- stricts exports. To firms in these countries, the
ume of sales. Antidumping actions tend to have a MFA restricts exports from their home base, but
similar effect - to keep import prices from slip- not necessarily their offshore exports. It is, at the
ping below the full-cost price in the home mar- same time, a guarantee of profits on the share of
ket. VERs tend to focus on supply discipline, the market they have managed to negotiate. In
from which price discipline follows; antidump- Hong Kong, for example, quota rights are allo-
ing focuses on price discipline, from which sup- cated among exporters according to historical
ply discipline follows. market shares, but these rights are negotiable
The most elaborate example of modern trend and tend to have a high market value. From 1982
of protection has evolved in textiles and clothing. to 1983, their value came to about 10 percent of
The centerpiece of protection in this sector is the the industry's value added, or 1.2 percent of Hong
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), under which each Kong's GDPY2
importing nation negotiates bilateral agreements Because of the immense discretion the MFA
with individual exporting nations covering quo- gives importers, political factors loom as impor-
tas on specific products. tant as economic ones. Prospective suppliers must
In addition, the industrial countries continue negotiate an agreed market share, that is, they
to maintain high tariffs in this sector. Post-Tokyo must compete diplomatically for an allowed vol-
Round rates on textiles and clothing ave rage 17 ume of exports. But having a quota and filling it
percent in the United States, 20 percent in Can- are not the same thing. The country must be able
ada, 10 percent in the European Community, to compete economically for that market share
Sweden and Switzerland, and 25 percent in Fin- with stronger established exporters.
land.20 These high tariffs have two effects: First, Over the long run, perhaps the most threaten-
they regulate trade in textiles and clothing among ing aspect of the MFA is the precedent it estab-
the industrial countries. (Intra-industrial country lishes. The MFA, in its inception, was an attempt
trade in textiles and clothing is about 50 percent to balance exporters' interests with those of im-
larger than industrial country imports from de- port-competing firms. The goals of the MFA ex-
veloping countries.21 Second, tariffs absorb some press this intent. The operational clauses of the
of the price margin created by the quantitative MFA however relate only to the control of dis-
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ruptive imports. Even though the trading nations cases in the European Community. American and
conscientiously negotiated this system under the Japanese plants have since been restructured and
GATT, the protection it incorporates has turned a large amount of older capacity shut down. Eu-
out to be much stronger than its antiprotection rope's petrochemical industry has also restruc-
disciplines. The large profits the MFA preserves tured but less extensively.
for established exporters reduces their interest in While capacity was contracting in the indus-
opposing such arrangements. Potential exporters trial countries, several oil-producing countries
may find it more attractive to negotiate for a were building large petrochemicals facilities.
share of a controlled market than to compete for Among Gulf countries, Iraq and Qatar were the
a share of an open one. first to move into petrochemicals in the mid-1970s.
World trade in steel is on the way to being as By 1985 Saudi Arabia had invested over $250
tightly controlled as trade in textiles and apparel. billion in its petrochemicals industry. The indus-
Imports to markets in the United States and the try seemed particularly well suited to Saudi Ara-
European Community are now controlled by 37 bia. It is quite capital-intensive and capital is a
bilateral arrangements; ten involve a developing relatively abundant resource in Saudi Arabia. In
country supplier.3 These steel arrangements have Saudi Arabia a basic feedstock, ethane gas, is a
not been incorporated into the GATT, and, as by-product of oil production and it is not eco-
compared with the bilateral arrangements nego- nomically viable to collect and liquify the gas for
tiated under the MFA, are less subject to require- export. The best economic alternative to use as a
ments of transparency and are even weaker vis- petrochemical feedstock is, in fact, flaring.
A-vis the balance of exporters versus importers. Middle East investments during this period
The petrochemicals industry presents an inter- were large. In just one year, 1985, capacity that
esting example of trade problems that primary- came onstream in Saudi Arabia increased global
producing countries encounter as they develop output 5 percent. Because this new capacity was
an indigenous processing capacity. In the early under construction in a period of slack demand
1960s, industrial countries' tariffs on petrochemi- and extensive restructuring, it aroused concerns
cals were high - between 20 and 40 percent on that industrial country markets would be
some products. During the Tokyo Round, sub- swamped by cheap petrochemical imports and
stantial reductions of petrochemical tariffs were the industry would be even further depressed.
negotiated. The U.S. valuation system (the These concerns turned out to be unwarranted; by
"American Selling Price") for assessing petro- the time Gulf capacity began to add substantially
chemical import values, which increased the ad to world supply, the market for petrochemicals
valorem equivalent of U.S. tariffs - was also had recovered its vigor. According to the OPEC
eliminated. Moreover, during the 1980s the United Bulletin of November 1987, "The industry was
States and others dropped their prior licensing fortunate that the new producers of the Middle
requirements for petroleum imports. The indus- East and Canada came on stream and entered the
trial countries had also expanded capacity to meet marketplace in this commercial environment.
projected buoyant domestic demand. The actual Saudi Arabian production has been absorbed
growth of demand was much less than expected. without the anticipated upset in world markets
By 1981, excess world capacity ran from 25 per- and, in fact, it has been needed to supply this
cent (synthetic fiber) to 50 percent (ethylene) of surging demand growth."
world consumption, and the petrochemicals in- As petrochemicals prices recovered, the num-
dustry in the United States, Europe, and Japan ber of antidumping cases filed by the United
was suffering major losses. Since the industry States and the European Community dropped
has relatively low variable costs, price cutting sharply - from 98 in the five years from 1980 to
became fierce. Price cutting across national bor- 1984, to 20 in the three years from 1985 to 1987.
ders is often in conflict with antidumping rules, Of these 118 antidumping cases, only two were
and producers in many developed nations sought filed against Gulf suppliers (Kuwaiti and Saudi
protection in the form of antidumping actions, urea exports). These cases came at the same time
often as a complement to the tacit acceptance by as cases against six other exporters of urea and
the government of price-fixing arrangements covered 11 percent of Saudi Arabia's and 46 per-
among domestic producers. Between 1980 and cent of Kuwait's 1986 exports of petrochemicals
1984, there were 21 antidumping cases on petro- to the EC. Six exporting countries agreed to ob-
chemical products in the United States and 77 serve a minimum price on urea exports to the EC.
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Saudi Arabia, along with Libya, did not agree petrochemical feedstocks varies directly with the
and in the end an antidumping duty of 46 per- price of crude petroleum. However, the Gulf
cent was imposed on urea from Saudi Arabia, a countries produce feedstock from gases that have
slightly lower duty on imports from Libya. no alternative economic use. A tight world mar-
There are two other recorded import policy ket for petrochemicals benefits industrial coun-
actions against Persian Gulf exports. The first try and Gulf producers alike. The most advanta-
was an EC decision in 1985 to apply to Saudi geous situation for OECD petrochemical produc-
Arabian polyethylene, methanol, and glycol the ers, however, is when the crude oil market is
13 to 14 percent ad valorem rates specified in the depressed and the petrochemical market is boom-
EC's Common External Tariff, and applied to ing. In this situation their disadvantage on feed-
imports from all developed and developing coun- stock prices is minimized, and offset by the much
tries that are larger than the "competitive need" higher cost of transporting petrochemicals instead
thresholds specified in the EC's tariff preference of crude oil. As a result Gulf oil producers are di-
system. This was an action within the discretion- versifying into ownership of petrochemical com-
ary authority of existing EC regulations. Nego- panies with production facilities in the industrial
tiations to reverse the action continued until 1987, countries. Their home production will be rela-
when the regulations were changed to shift im- tively profitable when the crude oil market is
ports of petrochemicals from Saudi Arabia into a tight; offshore investments when oil prices are
category on which the EC staff does not have the low. Such diversification is also a hedge against
authority to provide duty-free treatment under the anti-import actions that might be devised
GSP. when the industry moves into its next cyclical
In oil-importing countries, the price of basic downturn.
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The concentration of exports
The middle-income developing economies ac- Table 6 Share of manufactured exports by
count for a large and growing share of manufac- selected developing economies
tured exports. Lower-income economies have (percent)
not kept pace as suppliers of manufactured ex- 1965 1985
ports (see table 6). In 1965, the World Bank's list
of low-income developing economies produced Low income 30 16
almost a third of all manufactured exports from China 11 10
developing economies; two decades later they India 11 3
were down to only a sixth. If China and India are Other low income 8 3
excluded from this group, the others account for Middle income 70 84
only 3 percent of developing economies' manu- East Asian Four, 20 56
factured exports. Most of the shift stems from the South Africa 8 3
growing share of Singapore, Hong Kong, South Other middle income 42 25
Korea, and Taiwan. By 1985, these four accounted
for more than half the manufactures exported by Total 100 100
the 93 developing economies. In fact since 1980, Note: Based on a selected group of 93 developing economies.
all four have usually been in the top 20 exporters a. Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan.
of manufactures. By 1986, manufactured exports Source: Comtrade database.
from Korea and Taiwan exceeded those of Can-
ada; Hong Kong's manufactured exports ex-
ceeded those of Sweden and Austria; together
the manufactured exports of Hong Kong, Korea,
and Taiwan exceeded those of the United States.
Still, export growth has not been confined to ports together are less than a sixth as large as
these four. A number of other developing econo- those (total) of the four Asian NIEs. Export val-
mies have experienced rapid growth of manufac- ues for the other 25 total less than the total for
tured exports, though the value of these exports Mexico and Brazil.
is still relatively small. From 1965 to 1985, 27 de- Four countries - the United States, Japan, the
veloping economies (outside the four Asian Federal Republic of Germany, and the United
Newly Industrializing Economies [NIEsD) in- Kingdom - have imported three-quarters of
creased their manufactured exports by a larger developing country manufactured exports for
percentage than Singapore. Included in this 27 more than 20 years (see table 7, overleaf). Re-
are Brazil and Mexico, whose manufactured ex- cently, the first three have accounted for over
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Table 7 Country shares of manufactured two-thirds. In fact, since 1980 the United States
imports from developing economies and Japan have been responsible for two-thirds
(percent) of the increment of developing country manufac-
1965 1975 1986 tured exports; the United States alone accounted
for more than half. Almost three-fifths of these
All industrial countries 100 100 100 imports come from the four Asian NIEs; Ger-
many's import sources are dispersed.
United States 33 34 51 These large export shares have been earned
European Community 47 43 30 mostly by providing reliable supplies of high
United KRgdom 24 16 1 quality, competitively priced merchandise. But
France 3 5 5 finding ways to minimize the impact of trade
Italy 2 3 3 restrictions has also played a role. Economic
Japan 5 8 8 actions to exploit the loopholes in import restric-
Canada 3 3 3 tions have been important, for example, in shift-
Other industrial countries 12 12 8 ing the product variety. Political skills - to pre-
serve and sometimes create the loopholes - are
Source: Comtrade database. also useful.
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Effects on developing countries
There are a number of recent examinations of Table 8 Efficiency gains to developing
industrial country trade restrictions. Most of these countries from removal of industrial countries'
studies, however, concentrate on own-country trade barriers
effects. There have been few studies of the effects
on exporting countries; particularly few estimates As a percentage As a percentage
of the efficiency effects on developing country of developing of industrial
suppliers - the cost to these economies of the
inability to exploit their comparative advantage Unilateral removal by:
and use their resources in sectors in which these European Community 1.1 0.7
resources are, by world standards, the most ef- United States 0.8 0.4
fective. This section will review the effects of Japan 0.7 0
industrial country trade restrictions on the ex- Multilateral removal by:
port earnings of developing countries and on AU industrial countries 2.9 0.6
their overall potential to produce output from a
given resource base - the efficiency, or welfare, Note: Estimates of the effects of the complete removal of all
effect. tariffs and nontariff barriers in place in 1977. The estimates
assume no change in the level of resource utilization.
Source: John WhaUey (1985, p 181).
Efficiency or "welfare" gains
Table 8 presents estimates of the welfare gain
from elimination of all industrial country tariffs
and nontariff barriers.24 These estimates are from
simulations on one of the few global general possible improvements in efficiency that might
equilibrium models that has been used to exam- be stimulated by specific static gains, or by a
ine complete trade liberalization, and do not cover more open trading system. Finally, the simula-
the effects of nonborder measures. The welfare tions that the estimates are based on assume that
gain measures the increase in real national in- macroeconomic management maintained a given
come. It takes into account the increase of real level of resource utilization in each country.
output that results from "allocative efficiency" - The estimated efficiency effect then comes to
shifting resources toward sectors in which a coun- about 3 percent of all developing countries' GNP.
try has comparative advantage - and the gain In other words, because of industrial country trade
(or loss) of purchasing power resulting from terms restrictions, the developing countries' GNP is,
of trade changes. These figures are measures of each year, about 3 percent less than it otherwise
the static gains. They do not take into account would be. This cost, as related to industrial coun-
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try income, comes to 0.6 percent, or about twice Factor mobility and flexibility
the 0.3 percent that the OECD countries devote to
official development assistance. How countries adjust to trade restrictions is diffi-
An alternative estimate by Haaland and Nor- cult to measure. The easier and faster the reallo-
man2s came to the same overall figure but sepa- cation of resources from product lines or indus-
rates the effects on the major exporters of manu- tries under restriction to other product lines or
factures and on other developing countries. As industries the less the impact of protection.30 This
one might expect, the impact on the major ex- flexibility requires several factors that are usually
porters of manufactures is larger - about 4 per- found in proportion to a country's development.
cent of GNP as compared with 2 to 2.5 percent for Entrepreneurship and marketing skills are one
other developing countries. such factor. A poorer country's contact with inter-
Keep in mind the limits of such estimates. The national markets is often through the periodic
models are built on a 1979 database, and in 1979 visits of buyers from the major markets. If a
trade restrictions were less extensive than they country has developed a capacity to produce,
are now. Further, they exclude many dynamic say, tableware to international specifications, and
impacts of policy changes and do not incorporate tableware imports to the designated market are
the trade effects of nonborder measures. restricted, the foreign buyer no longer appears.
Thus, the exporter is not informed on designs
Effect on export receipts that might minimize the impact of restrictions or
sell well in other markets, nor how to shift his
Estimates of effects on export earnings tend to production to such designs and his sales to such
take a shorter perspective - to focus on increased markets.
exports as a matter of putting idle resources to On the production side, a high investment rate
use, or of switching resources from producing and an educated labor force are important for
for the domestic market, where they do not earn flexibility. A high investment rate allows a rapid
foreign exchange, to producing for the export reshaping of a country's capital stock. Conversely,
market, where they do. In line with such con- a low investment rate makes it difficult to move
cerns, a recent United Nations Conference on out of production affected by trade restrictions.
Trade and Development study has estimated that High savings rates or capital inflows are corollar-
elimination of all industrial country trade restric- ies of high investment, while financial mecha-
tions would lead to a more than 10 percent in- nisms capable of channeling capital to the most
crease in developing country exports. More than productive uses are also needed. Likewise, a
40 percent of this increase would be exports of labor force with a high level of education can
clothing, another 10 percent exports of food and adjust more quickly than a less educated labor
food products.26 Erzan and Karsenty found that force. Finally, it is important how these charac-
the gains from reducing the highest industrial teristics interact with the factors on which a coun-
country tariffs to a maximum 10 percent would try's trade composition is based.
be even more concentrated on clothing and tex- International movement of goods and (nonfac-
tiles, products that bear the highest tariffs and tor) services tend to compensate for unequal en-
most restrictive NTBs37 dowments in factors of production. Increased
Viewed from a longer-term perspective, this trade restraints have been reinforced by reduced
concentration of the trade effects of protection mobility of capital and labor in the 1980s. The
indicates it has had a significant effect on re- debt crisis has slowed capital flows to many de-
source allocation. Other analyses corroborate this. veloping countries. Actual and potential trade
Kirmani concluded that the removal of tariff and restrictions reduce creditworthiness and are dis-
nontariff barriers in the main OECD countries incentives to foreign private direct investment.
could increase developing country exports of And while there were major labor movements
textiles by 82 percent and clothing by 93 per- from South to North in the 1950s and 1960s, espe-
cent.28 Deardorff and Stern, in an analysis fo- cially in Western Europe and North America,
cused particularly on the allocative effects of in- high unemployment levels in Europe halted -
dustrial country protection, estimated that em- and in some cases reversed - this trend. In the
ployment in the apparel industry would increase United States the new immigration law is de-
by more than 20 percent in seven of the 16 devel- signed to reduce the inflow of undocumented
oping economies in the study.29 workers. Yet in the presence of huge interna-
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tional income differences, highlighted by the free desirable way to eliminate these pressures. Con-
flow of information, pressures to migrate are versely, for countries well endowed with capital
bound to rise. Free trade and free capital move- but short of labor, capital expenses may relieve
ments may well constitute the politically most economic pressures to import labor.
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Major findings and implications
The major findings of this review are listed be- tariffs and NTBs - often increase with the de-
low. The obvious policy recommendation in each gree of processing. This escalation protects not
instance is to remove the trade restriction. As only sophisticated forms of processing and refin-
trade liberalization brings increased efficiency to ing but also such simple processes as crating and
the liberalizer and to its trading partners, all sides packaging - activities of particular interest to
will benefit. But developing the institutions that lower-income developing countries whose export
will transform this concept into political action is receipts are concentrated on a few primary prod-
a challenge. ucts. Furthermore, tariffs or taxes on any stage
1. While agriculture and transportation tend to tend to raise the cost of the final good and thereby
be heavily subsidized in industrial countries, reduce demand for the primary product. This is
industry on the whole is aided primarily by im- a further burden on countries dependent on pri-
port restrictions. The shift toward direct subsi- mary products.
dies for manufacturing in the late 1970s and early 5. There has been a significant increase in the
1980s seems to have been temporary. Border 1980s in the number of admninistered protection
protection seems to be preferred, particularly in cases (for example, antidumping, countervailing
manufacturing segments in which developing duty), particularly against developing countries.
countries have a strong export interest, such as These cases not only generate specific trade re-
steel. strictions and create uncertainty as to the contin-
2. Industrial country tariffs tend to be consid- ued openness of industrial country markets, they
erably higher on manufactured imports from also constitute an additional expense for trading
developing than from industrial countries. Two enterprises. This uncertainty may be a signifi-
factors underlie this difference: cant impediment to international trade, as are the
a. MFN rates tend to be higher on products ex- legal and administrative expenses of protection.
ported by developing countries. 6. Industries with high fixed costs often file
b. Reductions from MFN rates on imports of antidumping cases in order to extend to imports
manufactured goods from industrial countries, the "price discipline" that domestic firms have
particularly among Western European countries, established, often with tacit government approval.
are larger than reductions or preferences on im- Steel, autos, and petrochemicals are examples.
ports from developing countries. 7. The growth of global systems of VERs (for
3. Developing country exports of manufactured instance, the MFA) tends to eliminate interna-
goods to industrial countries face 50 percent more tional resistance to protection. The price disci-
NTBs than similar trade among industrial coun- pline and barriers to entry provided by such sys-
tries. tems assure strong exporters of continuing prof-
4. Restrictions on commodity imports -both its and seduce potential suppliers to negotiate for
20
a share of a controlled market rather than com- tropical products would be trimmed by at least
pete for a share of an open one. half. This cut would be combined with the pro-
8. The United States purchases over half of all gressive elimination of consumption taxes on
industrial countries' manufactured imports from tropical products. Many such proposals are con-
developing countries. The European Commu- tingent on developing countries joining in the
nity accounts for less than a third, down from bargaining, in a way commensurate with their
almost half in 1965, and Japan has less than a 10 development, financial and trade situation. There
percent share. The East Asian NIEs account for is a risk that attention will focus on sophisticated
over half of developing country exports of manu- forms of processing, while unsophisticated proc-
factures. essing, such as crating and packaging, are of more
9. Industrial country protection reduces devel- immediate interest to many poorer countries.
oping country national income by roughly twice Nontariff barriers on industrial goods will be
the amount provided by official development negotiated in at least four groups - nontariff
assistance. measures, safeguards, subsidies and countervail-
10. Relatively high industrial country MFN tar- ing measures, and textiles and clothing. The
iffs on manufactured products of export interest group negotiating the reduction of NTBs has re-
to developing countries and the dominance (es- ceived several proposals, including one from the
pecially in Western Europe) of preferences that United States that NTBs be included along with
favor other Western European countries over the tariff reductions in negotiations on exchange of
developing countries reflect the importance of concessions. Australia has proposed that the ef-
reciprocity in reducing trade restrictions. fective protection equivalent be used to guide
11. GSP schemes often exclude key developing and monitor negotiations on tariffs and NTBs.
country exports and can be withdrawn unilater- The objective of the textile and clothing group is
ally. to formulate modalities that would facilitate trade
liberalization and permit the eventual integra-
The Uruguay Round tion of this sector into GATT. The groups on
GATT articles, safeguards, subsidies and the
Industrial countries do not usually change their Tokyo Round codes will review the GATT ad-
trade regimes unilaterally; they negotiate agree- ministrative procedures. The objective is to con-
ments at multilateral trade talks. The Uruguay tain gray area measures and to minimize the ex-
Round is thus an important vehicle for reducing tent to which the procedures themselves have a
the impact of industrial countries' trade restric- negative effect on trade.
tions on developing countries. Talks come at a By the end of 1992 the members of the Euro-
crucial time for the multilateral system. Trade pean Community will have one single market;
restrictions have begun to multiply, and there is a the largest in the world. This will have a major
growing movement toward bilateral agreements, impact on manufactured exports of developing
including the EFTA-EEC, Australia-New Zeal- countries, particularly since the U.S. market may
and, and U.S.-Canada. Bilateral trade threats have be less buoyant as the nation redresses its macro-
also increased, and "gray area" trade barriers economnic imbalances. The trade policies of the
(measures against the spirit, but not the letter of European Community will thus be of immense
GATT) have grown. Both the liberal open trade importance to developing countries.
environment and its major principles - nondis-
criminatory treatment and multilateralism - are Reducing protectionist pressures
now at stake.
Because the developing countries have much Beyond the Uruguay Round, improved institu-
to lose if this scenario occurs, they are very active tional arrangements will also be needed. Trade
participants in the round. Several issues are of restrictions take subtle forms that mute export-
particular interest. A number of tariff proposals ing firms' and consumers' resistance. As a result
have been offered. Some emphasize the elimina- the political base for open trade has been eroded.
tion of all industrial tariffs while others focus on Creating increased public awareness of the econ-
the remaining higher rates. The European Com- omy-wide costs of protection - and channeling
munity has proposed that duties on semi- this awareness into more effective trade-support-
processed tropical products be eliminated or sig- ing arrangements - is the other cornerstone in
nificantly reduced; even tariffs on final processed reversing protectionist trends and revitalizing the
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world economy. eral budget, and provides information on state
A number of ways have been suggested that and local assistance programs. In Australia, the
would augment public awareness of the domes- Industries Assistance Commission's statutory
tic costs of import restrictions. The 1985 "Leut- charter requires it to report on government assis-
wiler Report," commissioned by the GATT, sug- tance to industries and on the economy-wide ef-
gested that: fects of that assistance. Its tabulations of such
"In each country, the making of trade policy assistance have had a significant impact on pub-
should be brought into the open. The costs and lic discourse, and its use of the "effective protec-
benefits of trade policy actions, existing and pro- tion" concept has introduced the concept into the
spective, should be analyzed through a 'protec- public domain.
tion balance sheet.' Private and public companies International surveillance is a necessary com-
should be required to reveal in their financial plement. Interests that benefit from public assis-
statements any subsidies received. Public sup- tance will work constantly to minimize the cov-
port for open trade policies should be fostered." erage of national surveillance. Each time the
Paul Volcker, in his address on the 40th anni- Federal Republic of Germany has revised its defi-
versary of the GAIT, suggested that the GATT nition of subsidies for the Subsidies Report the
Secretariat sponsor, say once a year, a careful amount of subsidization reported has becoi.ne
investigation of an important trade issue. Mr. smaller.32 Australian experience provides another
Vokcker offered two possible topics: the costs such example, Assistance in Australia has been
and consequences of the shift from tariffs to NTBs; expanding through forms (such as antidumping)
and the costs of selected protectionist measures that evade the commission's coverage. To com-
recently adopted by industrial and developing plement better national surveillance, then, the
countries. GATT Secretariat could have enhanced authority
"[Clareful analysis, sponsored by a neutral and and capacity to collect and publish information
respected institution," Mr. Volcker commented, on national policy measures that affect trade.
"can itself be a powerful force in shaping an The economics of the matter are that, in the
informed consensus." end, more imports as well as more exports are
The Federal Republic of Germany's biannual generated by an open trading system. The more
"Subsidies Report,"3' required by law, lists sub- the public is aware of this truth the greater and
sidy programs implemented through tax allow- the more secure will be the opportunity for each
ances as well as programs funded under the fed- country to develop and prosper.
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Endnotes
1. World Development Report 1988. icy setting." (OECD 1987b, p. 224).
2. The operational definition of manufactures 7. Juttemeier 1987, p. 2.
is Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) 8. The subsidy element in export guarantee,
categories 5 through 8, mninus 68. The coverage of insurance and credit programs (as estimated by
these categories is as follows: Henry 1987), as a fraction of direct payments to
SITC 5: Chemnical elements and compounds enterprises by central governrments in 1983-84 is
6: Semnimanufactures and manufactures by as follows: Federal Republic of Germany, 2.0%;
material United Kingdom, 4.0%; France, 4.0%; United
7: Machinery and transport equipment States, 3.4%.
8: Miscellaneous manufactures 9. OECD 1987b, p. 232.
68: Nonferrous metals 10. GATT 1987.
3. "Monetary, energy and technological up- 11. The prominence of agriculture in the Uru-
heavals have meant stormy times for all economic guay Round has led to considerable attention to
players but especially for governments. Pulled in the effects on manufacturing output and employ-
every direction by interest groups, governments ment of governmental assistance to agriculture.
have found it difficult to sort out their priorities A series of studies organized by the Center for
and evaluate their actions in the industrial field." International Economics in Canberra will esti-
(OECD 1987b, p. 223). mate how other sectors are affected by support
4. The test of "general availability' is a basic for agriculture in the European Community, Ja-
concept used to guide enforcement of antisub- pan, Korea, and the United States. A "reverse
sidy, or countervailing-duty law. While general case" - the cost to Australian agriculture of high
availability is useful, it is not a perfect screen. levels of Australian support for manufacturing
Some sectors may be more "education intensive" -- will also be included. The OECD Secretariat is
or "transport intensive" than others, and there- working on a single global model to give similar
fore relatively advantaged by the general provi- estimates for OECD countries.
sion of education or roads and highways. 12. OECD 1987a, p. 132.
5. A catalogue of objectives and instruments is 13. Industries Assistance Commission, 1987.
provided in OECD 1978. 14. Compared to figures for all industrial coun-
6. A recent OECD study accepted the impossi- tries, the average Australian tariff rate is 1.8 times
bility of providing a generic definition and opted as high. (Finger and Laird 1987). Australian NTBs
instead to take a pragmatic approach, to proceed cover 1.3 times as large a fraction of imports
without a definition, while acknowledging that (Nogues, Olechowski and Winters 1986) and
"the field of investigation... is bound to vary Australian subsidies (as a share of GNP) are 0.9
according to each country's institutional and pol- times as large. (OECD 1986) Imports as a share of
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GNP are approximately the same for Australia as 20. USTR 1979.
for the industrial countries as a group, 18 per- 21. Cable 1987, p. 181.
cent. (WDR '87) If, in calculations for the indus- 22. Hamilton 1985.
trial countries, we use the same elasticities as 23. GATT 1987, pp. 98-100.
were used in the Australia calculation, take non- 24. Whalley 1985.
border assistance to be twice as high as in Austra- 25. Haaland and Norman 1987.
lia, border protection to be one-half as high, we 26. UNCTAD 1986.
would still conclude that $8.00 of every $10.00 of 27. Erzan and Karsenty 1987.
assistance would be provided through the price 28. Kirmani 1984.
effects of import restrictions. 29. Deardorff and Stem 1988.
15. GATT 1980. 30. Capacity to resist the imposition of protec-
16. This section draws on information from tion by threatening retaliation in some economic,
Erzan and Karsenty 1987, including unpublished political, or strategic form is also important. This
material supplied by the authors. capacity is enhanced by economic size and by
17. GATT 1988. strategic and political links.
18. Finger 1987, p. 158. 31. Deutscher Bundestag 1987.
19. GATT 1987. 32. Juttemeier 1987, p. 2.
24
References
Australia, Industries Assistance Commission. Dutailly, Jean Claude. 1984. "Aides aux Enter-
1987. Assistance to Agriculture and Manufactur- prises: 134 Milliards de Francs en 1982." Econ-
ing Industries. Canberra: Australian Govern- omie et Statistique. September:3-12.
ment Publishing Service. Erzan, Refik, and Guy Karsenty. 1987. 'Troducts
Balassa, Bela, and Constantine Michalopoulos. Facing High Tariffs in Major Developed Mar-
1985. "Trade Policy Issues, Protectionism and ket Economy Countries: An Area of Priority
Development." Development Committee Pa- for Developing Countries in the Uruguay
per. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Round?" UNCTAD Discussion Paper 22.
Business Week. March 14, 1988, p.50. UNCTAD, Geneva.
Cable, Vincent. "Textiles and Clothing." In J.M. Finger, J. Michael, and Samuel Laird. 1987.
Finger and A. Olechowski, eds. The Uruguay "Protection in Developed and Developing
Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Countries-An Overview." Journal of World Trade
Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Law 21(6):9-23.
Carmichael, William G. 1986. "National Interest Finger, J. Michael, and Andrzej Olechowski, eds.,
and International Trade Negotiations." The 1987. The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the
World Economy 9(4). Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Washington,
Corden, W.M. 1984. "The Revival of D.C.: World Bank.
Protectionism." Occasional Papers 14. Group GATT. 1980. "The Tokyo Round of Multilateral
of Thirty, New York Trade Negotiations-II Supplementary Report."
Deardorff, Alan V., and Robert M. Stern. 1988. GATT, Geneva.
"Alternative Scenarios for Trade Liberaliza- . 1985. Trade Policies for a Better Future. (The
tion." Paper presented at the Tenth Annual Leutwiler Report). Geneva: GATT.
Middlebury Conference on Economic Issues, . 1987 "Developments in the Trading Sys-
Middlebury, Vermont, April 7-9. tem: April-September 1987". #C/W/528.
De Melo, Jaime, and David Tarr. 1988. "Welfare GATT, Geneva.
Costs of US Quotas in Textiles, Steel and Au- . 1988. "Tropical Products: Background
tos". PPR Working Paper 83. World Bank, Material for Negotiations." MTN.GNG/NG6/
Washington, D.C. W/6/Revl. GATT, Geneva.
Deutscher Bundestag. 1987. "Bericht der Bun- Golub, Stephen, and J.M. Finger. 1979. "The Proc-
desregierung uiber die Entwichlung der Fi- essing of Primary Commodities: Effects of De-
nanzhilfer und Stever ver Gunstigungen veloped Country Tariff Escalation and Devel-
gemoss #12 des Gesetzes fur Forderung der oping Country Export Taxes." Journal of Politi-
Stabilitat und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft." cal Economy 87(2).
Bundestags druckstage, Bonn. Haaland, Jan I., and Victor D. Norman. 1987.
25
"EFFA and the World Economy: Comparative . 1987a. National Policies and Agricultural
Advantage and Trade Policy." EFTA Occasional Trade. Paris.
Paper 19. EFTA, Geneva. . 1987b. Structural Adjustment and Economic
Hamilton, Carl. 1985. "An Assessment of Volun- Performance. Paris.
tary Restraints on Hong Kong Exports to Eu- Snape, Richard. 1989. "Economics and Politics of
rope and the USA". Paper presented at the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties." In Brian
Institute of International Studies seminar, Uni- Hendley, ed., Regulatory Trade Measures and the
versity of Stockholm, June. Concept of Fair Trade. London: Trade Policy
Henry, Donald Putnam. 1987. "The Financial Research Centre.
Cost of Export Credit Programs". 3491-USDP. Spinanger, D. 1987. "Will the Multi-Fibre Arrange-
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica. ment Keep Bangladesh Humble?" The World
Hudec, Robert. 1970. "The GATT Legal System: Economy.
A Diplomat's Jurisprudence." Journal of World Stem, Robert, and Bernard Hoekman. "The Codes
Trade Law, 4: 619-31. Approach." In J.M. Finger and A. Olechowski,
International Herald Tribune. February 15, 1988. eds. The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the
Jones, Colin D. 1987. "Tariff and Non-Tariff Bar- Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Washir.;ton,
riers to Trade". Government Economic Service D.C.: World Bank.
Working Paper 97. U.K. Department of Trade Tarr, David G. 1987. "Effects of Restraining Steel
and Industry, London. Exports from the Republic of Korea and Other
Juttemeier, Karl H. 1987. "Subsidizing the Fed- Countries to the United States and the Euro-
eral German Economy-Figures and Facts, 1973- pean Economic Community." World Bank Eco-
1984." Kiel Working Paper 27. Kiel Institute of nomic Review 1(3): 379-418.
World Economics. Trela, Irene, and John Whalley. 1988. "Do Devel-
Kirmani, N., P. Molajoni, and T. Mayer. 1984. oping Countries Lose from the MFA?" Paper
"Effects of Increased Market Access on Exports presented at seminars in Western Ontario and
of Developing Countries." IMF Staff Papers 31(4), National Bureau of Economnic Research, March.
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary UNCTAD. 1986. "Protectionism and Structural
Fund. Adjustment, Introduction and Part I." TD/B/
Kostecki, Michel. 1987. "Export-Restraint Ar- 1081. UNCTAD, Geneva.
rangements and Trade Liberalization." The U.S. Trade Representative. 1979. Twenty-Fourth
World Economy 10(4): 425-54. Annual Report of the President of the United States
Messerlin, Patrick A. 1987. "Nonborder Measures on the Trade Agreement Program. Washington,
to Assist Industry." In J.M. Finger and A. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Olechowski, eds. The Uruguay Round: A Hand- Volcker, Paul A. 1987. "The GATT Under Stress-Is
bookfortheMultilateralTradeNegotiations. Wash- There Life After 40?" Address to the GATT
ington, D.C.: World Bank. Fortieth Anniversary, November 30. Geneva.
Nogues, Julio, Andrzej Olechowski, and L. Alan Whalley, John. 1985. Trade Liberalization Among
Winters. 1986. "The Extent of Nontariff Barri- Major World Trading Areas. Cambridge: MIT
ers to Industrial Countries' Imports." The World Press.
Bank Economic Review 1(1):181-99. World Bank. 1987. World Development Report.
NSW Farmers Association. 1987. The Primary Re- New York: Oxford University Press.
port. Sydney: NSW Farmer's Association. Yeats, Alexander. "The Escalation of Trade
OECD. 1978. Selected Industrial Policy Instruments. Barriers." In J.M. Finger and A. Olechowski
Paris. eds. The Uruguay Round, a Handbook for the
.1986. National Accounts 1. Paris. MulilateralTradeNegotiations. Washington,D.C.:
World Bank.
26
Annex
Annex Table 1 Extent of selected industrial countries' NTBs on imports from industrial and
developing countries, 1984
Percentage of Percentage of
value of imports from import categories from
Industrial Developing Industrial Developing
Product category countries countries countries countries
All 17 19 11 21
Agricultural 44 33 42 35
Fuels and Ores 18 10 13 11
Manufacturing 14 21 7 18
Textiles 25 62 20 58
Steel 50 46 21 21
Footwear 2 4 14 14
Electrical machines 10 7 5 8
Vehicles 30 3 6 10
Note: The data cover a broad range of NTBs, induding paratariff measures (for example, variable levies, seasonal tariffs, countervailing and
antidumping duties) quantitative restrictions (including prohibitions, quotas, nonautomatic licensing& state monopolies, voluntary export
restraints, restraints under MFA and similar textile arrangements), import surveillance, and price control measures. Health and tedcnical regula-
tions are not included. The industrial market economies covered are Canada, the EC (exduding Spain and Portugal), Finland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States.
Source UNCrAD database.
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Annex Table 2 Industrial country imports of fuels and petrochemicals
(percentage of total imports)
United States Japan European Community
Source 1981 1984 1985 1986 1987 1981 1984 1985 1986 1987 1981 1984 1985 1986 1987
Mineral fuels and refinery producte
Industrial countries 19 28 31 29 26 9 10 11 15 ++ 12 17 19 21 22
Developing countries 81 72 69 71 74 91 90 89 85 ++ 88 83 81 79 78
Persian Gulf states b 21 9 5 11 13 53 48 46 40 ++ 42 14 12 17 16
Petrochemicals,
Industrial countries 88 80 78 80 83 77 79 76 74 ++ 75 78 76 78 79
Developing countries 12 20 22 20 17 23 21 24 26 ++ 25 22 24 22 21
Persian Gulf states 0.4 0 0.8 1.6 1.1 0 1.5 3.5 5.7 ++ 0 0.3 2.2 2.5 2.2
+ Indicates not available
a. SlTC 3
b. Indudes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
c. Includes the following SITC (Rev. 1) categories:
Synthetic rubber 231.2,599.76
Synthetic fibers 266.2 excl. 266.23
263.3 exd. 266.33
Organic petrochemicals 512,599.75
Plastics and synthetic resins 581 exd. (581.3, 581.91 and 581.92)
Carbon black 513.27
Surfectants 554.2
Source Comtrade database.
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